A Story of Three Bank-Regulatory Legal Systems: Contract, Financial Management Regulation, and Fiduciary Law

• Autore: Tamar Frankel
• Carica: A long-time member of the Boston University School of Law faculty, she was a visiting scholar at the Securities and Exchange Commission (1995-1997) and at the Brookings Institution (1987)
• Pagine: 91-105

ARTICLES & ESSAYS

DOI 10.6092/issn.2531-6133/6075

UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA LAW REVIEW

ISSN 2531-6133

[VOL.1:1 2016]

This article is released under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License

91

A Story of Three Bank-Regulatory Legal Systems: Contract, Financial

Management Regulation, and Fiduciary Law

TAMAR FRANKEL†

TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. Inod cionq q Whq iq heq Deoioq Tq Ccialq oq heq

Survival of any Bank?; 3. The U.S. Banks, Their View, and the View of Their Regulators

in Maintaining the Trust of Their Depositors and Their investors; 3.1. A bit of History;

4. The Design of Banks and Their Regulation in Japan; 5. Trust-based Banking Law in

Israel; 6. Conclusion: Food for Thought.

ABSTRACT: How should banks be regulated to avoid their failure? Banks must control

heq ikq heq akeq ihq deoioq moneq Ifq deoioq loeq heiq q inq heiq

banks, and demand their money, the banks will fail. This article describes three legal

bank regulatory systems: Contract with depositors (U.S.); a mix of contract and trust

law, but going towards trust (Japan), and a full trust-fiduciary law regulating banks

IaelqTheqaicleqconcldeq haqbankqeglaionqhichqlimiqheqbankqikqand

conflicts of interest, helps create trustworthy banks that serve their country best.

KEYWORDS: Banking; Trust; Regulation; United States; Japan.