Democratization and the relevance of history: the case of Pakistan

• Autore: Elisa Giunchi
• Carica: Associate Professor, History and Institutions of Muslim Countries, Università degli Studi di Milano
• Pagine: 127-145

Democratization and the relevance of history: the case of

Pakistan

Elisa Giunchi

Abstract

Many political scientists have argued, on the basis of extensive quantitative data, that

democratic governments result in greater spending in health and education and in a

redistribution of resources in favour of vulnerable groups. Democratic governments are

also often associated with a decrease in levels of interstate conflict and in internal

violence. And yet, there are cases – such as Pakistan – in which this has not occurred.

Why have these ‘democracy dividends’ not been realiz ed in Pakistan? This pa per

addresses some of t he reasons why democratic governance in Pakistan has not translated

into social welfare and peace, and highlights that the impact of democracy is time and

context-specific. Therefore, greater attention must be devoted to the historical and

societal peculiarities of each country.

Keywords: Pakistan – democratization – welfare – ethnic and religious strife.

SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. 2. The literature on the effects of democratization. 3.

The 1988-1999 ‘democratic phase’ and welfare. 4. Democracy and peace. 5.

Conclusions.

 Associate Pro fessor, History and Institutions of Musl im Countries, Università degli Studi di

Milano. Suggested citation: E. Giunchi, D emocratization and the Relevance of History: The case

of Pakistan, in Nuovi Autoritarismi e Democrazie: Diritto, Istituzioni, Società (NA D), n. 1/2019,

pp. 126-144. The text has been submitted on 5 May 2019. The au thor thanks the anonymous

reviewers.

Nuovi Autoritarismi e Democrazie:

Diritto, Istituzioni, Società

n. 1/ 2019 ISSN 2612-6672 | 127

1. Introduction

In this paper we will test the dominant theories on the effects of

democratization by looking at Pakistan, which since its birth in 1947 has seen the

alternation of unelected civilian governments which allowed for some measure of

political openness (1947-1958), elected civilian governments characterized by

multiparty politics and fairly free elections (1970-’77, 1988-’99, 2008 to present),

military governments arising from coup d’etats (1958-’69, 69-71, 1977-’88, 1999-

2008). However, we have to keep in mind that there are no sharp divisions

between one period and the other: some military leaders allowed for limited

periods some level of participatory democracy, including elections (such as those

for the national and provincial assemblies held on a non-party basis in 1985 under

Zia ul-Haq, and the general elections held in 2005 under Musharraf), while during

some democratic phases unelected institutions such as the military influenced

decision-making. The most glaring example was that of the 1990s, when Benazir

Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had to give way to the army in a number of issues; when

they attempted to exert greater control over the army, they were forced to step

down. Benazir Bhutto’s government was dismissed twice by the President under

military pressure, and Nawaz Sharif was removed from his post by a coup in the

aftermath of the Kargill war. Elections held in the 1990s were characterized

according to some analysts by bogus votes, intimidation and enticement of voters,

and tampering of the results at the polling stations. That the passage between

democratic and undemocratic phases is much more nuanced that it may appear at

first sight is shown also by the case of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Bhutto, the founder

and head of the PPP, became president and then prime minister following the

1970 national elections, the first to be held in the country. He allowed

multipartitism and in 1977 he called for general elections. And yet, we cannot

consider him an elected leader: first of all, it had been the Awami League -AL

based in the Eastern wing, not the PPP, that had won the elections in 1970. The

AL’s leader Mujibur Rahman should have formed the new government. The

reluctance of the military and civilian elites of the western wing, including Bhutto,

to recognize the result of the vote precipitated the civil war, which resulted in the

dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. Bhutto, whose party had arrived second at

the general elections, became prime minister in the aftermath of the secession.

Second, the 1977 elections called by Bhutto were, according to the opposition and

many analysts, heavily rigged. In sum, the Pakistani case reminds us that there are

no clear-cut divisions between types of governments.

In the following pages we will look at the period 1988-1999, one that is usually

described in western literature as democratic, and assess whether it produced or

not any welfare dividends. We will then look at the correlation between regime

type and conflict throughout Pakistani history, with particular attention to internal