The 'Method and Madness' of Authoritarian Constitution Making in Democratic Regimes

• Autore: Amal Sethi
• Carica: Fellow, Faculty of Law, University of Hamburg
• Pagine: 5-24

ISSN: 2612-6672

3 • 2 • 2021

A. Sethi

The ‘Method and Madness’ of

Authoritarian Constitution Making

in Democratic Regimes

https://riviste.unimi.it/index.php/NAD/index

The “Method and Madness” of Authoritarian Constitution

Making in Democratic Regimes

Amal Sethi

Abstract

Globally, more than half the attempts at making a democratic constitution have failed to produce

one. Another large number of constitutions have suffered the ignominy of having a draft made

and implemented, but ultimately being rejected by the populace or political elites for failing to

perform its intended functions. A curious case emerges in instances when would-be-autocrats

draft authoritarian constitutions in democratic regimes. They do it rather successfully. Moreover,

they do so without using force, with the consent of large sections of the society, and in ostensibly

democratic ways. The question that then arises is how would-be-autocrats are more successful

than their democratic counterparts in such ventures. Using three varied examples of authoritarian

constitution-making from Hungary, Venezuela, and Turkey, this article will examine the ‘method

and madness’ behind the success of would-be autocrat’s constitution-making endeavors and these

authoritarian constitutions’ acceptance by the populace.

Keywords: Constitution-Making – Democratic Backsliding – Turkey – Hungary – Venezuela –

Democracy.

CONTENTS: 1. Prologue. 2. How to Successfully Draft a Constitution? 2.1 The Process of

Constitution-Making. 2.2 The Design of the Constitution. 3. Authoritarian Constitution

Making in Democratic Regimes. 3.1 Venezuela (Authoritarian Constitution-Making by

Bypassing the Existing Legal System). 3.2 Hungary (Authoritarian Constitution Within

the Existing Legal System). 3.3 Turkey (Constitution-Making Through Ordinary

Constitutional Amendments). 4. Conducting an Autopsy - Why Are Would-Be Autocrats

Successful in Making Authoritarian Constitutions? 4.1 Several Elements of A Successful

Constitution-Making Process. 4.2 Absence of Any Nonconformity Issues. 4.3 Workable

Constitutions. 4.4 Failure of Constitutional Safeguards and Institutional Checks. 4.5 Lack

of United Opposition Forces. 5. Epilogue.

Fellow, Faculty of Law, University of Hamburg. The author would like to thank Aditya Phalnikar, Karthik

Rai, Sumit Chatterjee, and Vasu Aggarwal for their excellent assistance on this article and the larger project.

The author would also like to thank the participants at the ICON:S Mundo Conference’s Panel on

‘Democratic Backsliding, Making, and Changing The Constitution’ for their valuable comments.

Furthermore, the author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their pertinent feedback and

observations. The essay was submitted to double blind peer review. Member of the Editorial Team who

oversaw the essay: Simone Gianello.